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 In 2008, Michelle Rhee graced the cover of TIME magazine, pictured in 
front of a blackboard, holding a broom next to the caption, “How to Fix America’s 
Schools.” Rhee, the former chancellor of D.C. public schools, has become one of 
the most recognizable and polarizing faces in the contemporary education movement, 
epitomizing the new wave of relatively young, hard-charging, data-driven, no-
excuses reformers. Rhee became controversial for her blunt personality and taking 
on the formidable teachers union. Her plans were two-fold: First, she wanted to 
evaluate teachers using their students’ standardized test scores. Second, she wanted to 
compensate teachers according to their evaluation scores. After three years in office, 
Rhee resigned. 
 In 2008, Barak Obama was also elected to office. Soon after, under the 
leadership of his Education Secretary, Arne Duncan, President Obama launched 
an extensive grant competition for cash-strapped states, titled Race to the Top 
(“RTT”).  Seen in large part as a response to the much-criticized legacy of the Bush 
Administration’s No Child Left Behind, the RTT initiative encouraged states to adopt 
new education laws in order to receive federal funding. To apply, states had to agree 
to allow teachers to be evaluated based on student achievement. The administration 
also bolstered funding to the Teacher Incentive Fund, which provides funds for the 
development and implementation of performance-based compensation. 
 The policies of both Race to the Top and Michelle Rhee characterize a 
significant shift in education reform thinking and implementation which has taken 
hold over the course of the past five years. There has been a heightened emphasis 
on the importance of high quality teachers, and thus a push in education policies to 
accurately evaluate them and couple incentives through compensation packages. As 
a result, more than 30 states and countless districts have changed their policies since 
2008 to reflect this new way of thinking (Doherty & Jacobs, 2013). Furthermore, 
between 2006 and 2010, nationwide spending on perfomance pay increased from $99 
million to $439 million (Blazer, 2011). 
 The Aldine Independent School District, located in Houston, Texas, is one 
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of the many districts undergoing tremendous change. Having recently implemented 
a new evaluation system and in the process of designing an aligned compensation 
system, Aldine finds itself in the position of wondering how best to implement new 
policies, particularly ones as high-stakes as determining the basis on which its teachers 
are paid. 
 This paper closely examines the notion of compensation reform in American 
public education, first exploring the history and implementation of “pay-for-
performance” initiatives around the country and then focusing on teacher perceptions 
of this increasingly popular reform. By surveying the Aldine ISD teaching force 
regarding their attitudes towards compensation reform, I am able to make some 
recommendations to the district, and districts in similar policy situations, regarding 
how to best make the teacher population more receptive to accept such reform.  
Background
 In 2007, the single salary schedule was described as a “nearly universal feature 
of American K-12 public school districts,” (Podgursky & Springer, 2007). Comprised 
of a pay scale determined by years of experience (called “steps”) and education 
credentials (called “lanes”), this compensation system has become ubiquitous in public 
education. Yet the two components of the single salary schedule, years experience and 
level of degree, have consistently failed to correlate with student outcomes leaving 
districts basing teacher pay on factors unrelated to their performance in the classroom 
(Goe & Stickler 2008, Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain 2005). Furthermore, high quality 
teaching candidates may feel disinclined to pursue a career in teaching due to the low 
salary as compared with other private sector positions, as well as the lack of financial 
reward for doing their job well or better than their peers. 
 However, the climate is changing. States and districts are now experimenting 
with the idea of a more market driven approach to teacher salaries, and more 
importantly, using teacher compensation as a way to communicate their values and 
priorities. Compensation reform, defined as aligning teacher financial incentives to 
student outcomes, has two goals. First, it should drive the improvement of student 
outcomes, or in more general terms, increase teacher productivity. Second, it should 
facilitate the recruitment of better teaching candidates (Hershberg & Robertson-Kraft, 
2009). Ultimately, compensation should reflect a district’s desire to reward skill 
development, improved student outcomes, and provide a basis for career progression 
(Odden & Wallace, 2008).
History
 Compensation reform as a policy initiative is hardly a new idea. Over the 
history of American public education, many large-scale changes have been made to 
its pay structures. In the early 19th century, education primarily existed in the form 
of small one-room schoolhouses, with teachers compensated in the form of room 
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and board at homes of their students. As the economy developed as a result of the 
Industrial Revolution, the demand for differentiated human capital increased. Teachers 
were needed in higher numbers and increased quality as the nation developed a rapid 
need for an educated work force. 
 A new compensation system accompanied this shift in school design. Under 
the new “grade-based” system, teachers were paid in a way similar to workers in 
other sectors of the economy, using a production model: teachers were compensated 
according to the level of skill required to educate them. For example, it was considered 
easier to teach young children than older children, and therefore the teachers of older 
children were paid more. An unintended consequence of the grade-based system turned 
out to be that the distribution of teaching positions, and therefore compensation, was 
biased based on race and gender. Additionally, nepotism was rampant.
The Single Salary System
 The solution to this problem arose with the increasing influence of labor 
unions in the early 20th century. Teachers joined forces to advocate for the single salary 
system, which determined compensation based on number of years of experience and 
level of educational attainment. Pay was uniform for all teachers in a district with 
the same qualifications, significantly reducing the instances of discrimination in the 
teaching profession. The single salary system quickly spread through country and has 
easily remained the most common compensation system in the country. There has 
been little to no real movement in this compensation structure over the course of the 
last 50 years, with 97% of districts having a single salary schedule in 1950, decreasing 
by only one percentage point by 2007 (Podgursky & Springer, 2007).
 Yet the single salary system has not always been without controversy. In 
1983, A Nation at Risk, rocked the education world. Detailing the mediocrity of 
American schooling for the first time, the seminal report put new pressure on schools 
to improve performance, particularly in comparison to the rest of the world (The 
National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983). It was in this context that 
the first merit pay programs were initially conceived, offering financial incentives 
ranging for individuals, groups of teachers, or entire school, and based on anything 
from classroom observations, teacher portfolios, to student performance. Teacher 
compensation was considered to be a relatively easy way to drive improvements 
in student performance, encouraging teachers to work harder or better. Individual 
districts and states experimented with implementing pay for performance systems, 
but no individual initiative or compensation model ever grew large enough to rival 
the single salary system, due in large part because teachers were unsupportive of the 
measures. Additionally, as teacher compensation became a popular area of research, 
merit pay consistently yielded mixed and confusing results regarding the program’s 
success on student performance. 
 The strongest advocates of the single salary system were and continue to 
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be the country’s teachers unions. Teachers initially rallied against the discriminatory 
compensation practices in schools, organizing around their perceived injustice. 
Throughout the mid-twentieth century, teachers advocated that all positions were 
equally challenging and therefore deserved the same pay. Unions, in particular, had a 
strong obligation to protect every due paying member, even those who do not perform 
at high levels, resulting in a general opposition to significant differentiation between 
the performance of teachers. Even today, in the face of countless studies indicating 
the ineffectiveness of the single salary system, the American Federation of Teachers 
argues for “enhancements” to the traditional approach rather than a complete overhaul 
(American Federation of Teachers, 2014).
Teacher Evaluations
 A discussion of compensation can hardly take place without examining 
performance metrics. Studies have consistently revealed the ineffectiveness of 
traditional methods of teacher evaluation. It is important to recognize that it is only 
possible to compensate good teacher performance if performance can be accurately 
measured. Progress in this regard has been hindered by the state of teacher evaluation 
systems across the county. This capacity has been limited; both by laws and 
policies governing teacher contracts as well accepted methodologies for measuring 
performance.
 Evaluation systems, historically, did not incorporate student outcomes 
and reflected little differentiation between performance levels within the teaching 
force.  In 2009, a study surveying twelve districts across four states revealed that 
the overwhelming majority of teacher evaluations did little to differentiate between 
the performance of teachers, with 99% of teachers receiving a “satisfactory” rating. 
Titled “The Widget Effect,” the report indicated that the information produced by the 
evaluations had virtually no consequences, either through professional development 
or dismissal (Weisberg, Sexton, Mulhern, & Keeling, 2009).w
 The fact that teacher evaluations were not identifying discrepancies between 
teacher performance does not mean that these discrepancies did not exist. For years, 
there has been evidence of large variations between classrooms and teachers regarding 
the growth of their students, suggesting that teaching has a substantial impact on student 
achievement (Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff 2011,  Hanushek 2010). In fact, some have 
gone so far as to say designing and implementing a high quality teacher evaluation 
system could be the most effective way to raise student achievement (Staiger, Gordon, 
& Kane, 2006). While non-school factors do influence student achievement, leading 
research suggests that teacher quality, over things like school funding or student-
teacher ratio, is the most import in-school factor to affect student outcomes (RAND 
Education, 2012). 
New Climate of Reform
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 Over the course of the last five years, the country’s interest in developing 
new methods to evaluate teachers has increased. This has resulted in a re-examination 
of both internal and external factors that affect such evaluations and significantly 
changed the laws that govern such evaluations.
Research 
 Researchers have come a long way in being able to isolate the specific effects 
a teacher has on student learning through the use of standardized test scores. The two 
primary ways to do this are to use a Value Added Model (VAM) or Student Growth 
Percentiles (SGPs). VAMs use multiple previous years of testing data to predict scores 
for individual students in a testing year. The model then averages the difference 
between student’s actual scores and predicted scores to determine the teacher’s overall 
added value  (RAND Education, 2012). 
 Conversely, SGPs work by comparing student growth to their academically 
similar peers. Students are assigned SGPs based on what their test scores were at the 
end of a year as compared to all the students who had the same score on a test the 
previous year. Therefore, an SGP of 50 would imply that the student’s growth was 
exactly the median for the evaluated students  (RAND Education, 2012). This method 
works well because it focuses on student growth rather than achievement, which has 
been shown to correlate highly with demographic factors such as socioeconomic and 
minority status. 
 Without a doubt, the most extensive study ever conducted on the measurements 
of teaching is the Methods of Effective Teaching study, a meticulous three-year research 
endeavor sponsored by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. They evaluated the 
way different measures of teacher performance correlated with student outcomes, 
examining different classroom observation rubrics, student perception surveys, and of 
course, student scores and gains on state tests. They determined that effective teaching 
can successfully be measured, but only through the use of multiple metrics that are 
carefully balanced. Additionally, through a controlled experiment, the authors were 
able to conclude that students of teachers who were rated as being highly effective 
in 2009-2010 performed better at the end of the following year, confirming that high 
quality teaching actually helps students to learn more. The study also means that there 
are reliable ways to measure whether teaching is of this high quality caliber or not 
(Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 2013). Research and methodologies dramatically 
changed the discussion regarding compensation reform, because districts can now be 
confident that they would be rewarding qualities that are integral to the overriding 
goal: help students to learn. 
 
Laws
 Yet it has not been research alone that has contributed to the dawn of the 
contemporary generation of education reform. Laws, at the district, state, and federal 
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level, have changed radically over the course of the past five years. Most notable is 
the Obama administration’s cornerstone education agenda, the $4 billion dollar grant 
program titled Race to the Top. Passed as part of the 2009 stimulus package, RTT 
was designed to incentivize reform of teacher evaluations, data management systems, 
academic standards, turnaround school models, and school choice through offering 
competitive grants to cash-strapped states in the wake of the 2008 financial recession. 
Since then, there have been four years of state competitions, touting an impressive 
participation record of 46 states and the District of Columbia adopting college- and 
career-ready standards, as well as national increases in high school graduation and AP 
participation rates  (The Executive Office of the President, 2014).
 Furthermore, RTT has created seismic changes in the way teacher 
evaluations are conducted in most states. As of September 2013, 35 states and DC 
mandate objective student outcome data (i.e. test scores) to be a significant or the most 
significant factor in teacher evaluations. These changes in evaluations have also paved 
the way for moderate changes in compensation reform nationwide, as six states now 
directly link financial incentives to teacher evaluation outcomes (Doherty & Jacobs, 
2013).  
 Other federal initiatives have also developed to incentivize compensation 
reform. In 2009, the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF), which had been founded three years 
previously, received a $200 million boost in funding through the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act. TIF supports districts, states, and nonprofits by providing grant 
money to design and implement performance-based teacher and principle pay systems 
in high-needs schools. To qualify, applicants must present bold and innovative proposals 
to establish pay scales that are differentiated by teacher performance, as defined by a 
combination of teacher observations and student achievement gains (Eckert, 2013). 
Ultimately, the education space looks very different today than it did five years ago, 
prompting even more interest in compensation reform and performance-based pay. 
Effects of Compensation Reform
 Some question whether compensation reform is really the answer to 
improving student achievement. Unfortunately, the existing literature on the effects of 
compensation reform on student outcomes is murky at best. Many studies have been 
done evaluating specific incentive-based compensation reform measures, ranging from 
both individual- and school-level bonuses, based on anything from “knowledge base” 
to special certification, to student achievement on standardized test scores. Because 
every instance of teacher compensation reform has involved a different model of both 
evaluation and incentive scheme, it is challenging to develop a clear explanation of 
which models work and which do not. In a meta-analysis conducted by Podgursky 
and Springer, eight distinct studies on compensation were aggregated. The studies, 
conducted from 1997 to 2002, yielded conflicting results (Podgursky & Springer, 
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2007). 
 These mixed results are exemplified by two subsequent studies, one conducted 
by Figlio and Kenny in 2007 and the other by Roland Fryer in 2011. Figlio and Kenny 
were the first to focus systematically examine the relationship between performance 
incentives for individual teachers and student achievement across the United States 
as a whole. The authors examined the National Education Longitudinal Survey and 
determined that students achieved higher test scores in schools where bonuses offered 
for good teacher performance. Additionally, they concluded that even relatively 
minor implementations of incentive pay affected student outcomes in a statistically 
significant way for both public and private schools. Furthermore they suggested that 
a high quality merit pay program’s impact can translate to student attendance, or in 
other words, is comparable to a one standard deviation decrease in days absent for the 
average student (Figlio & Kenny, 2006).
 Yet this study is seemingly contradicted by Fryer’s evaluation of New 
York City’s teacher incentive system in 2011. Conducted by Roland Fryer, a noted 
economist from Harvard, the study was conceptualized as a school-based randomized 
trial in over two hundred NYC public schools. NYC implemented a teacher incentive 
program between 2007 and 2010 where schools that met their performance goals 
were given an allowance of money to distribute between teachers as they best saw fit. 
Fryer’s analysis was done explicitly to determine how the teacher financial incentives 
affected student achievement. He found that there was no evidence that teacher 
incentives increased student performance, graduation, and attendance. Furthermore, 
he concluded that there were no changes to student or teacher behavior as a result of 
New York’s incentive scheme (Fryer, 2011). 
 The evaluations of these compensation systems reveal that, unsurprisingly, 
merely aligning financial incentives to good performance does not consistently yield 
higher student outcomes. 
Compensation Reform in the Modern Era
 While this literature is somewhat helpful in determining that compensation 
reform alone cannot necessarily achieve better student outcomes, it does little to 
address the current climate of contemporary education reform. The financial incentives 
previously discussed are almost exclusively bonuses layered on top of the already 
existing single salary system. Thus, it is different than the type of compensation 
reform that is currently being discussed (which involves doing away with the single 
salary schedule in its entirety). It also relies on teacher evaluation systems that are now 
out of date and were frequently considered subjective by those participating in the 
experiments.
 The challenging nature of objectively measuring teaching has been titled 
the “evaluation problem” in the classic performance management article written 
by Murnane and Cohen (1986). They argued that due to the “imprecise” nature 
of teaching, support for tying financial incentives to evaluation was doomed to be 
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fleeting. As mentioned previously, over the course of the past five years there has been 
a tremendous shift in focus regarding the evaluation of teachers, as administrators, 
researchers and policy makers alike have taken enormous strides to identify what 
constitutes high quality teaching. 
 Much of the previous literature on compensation reform makes the 
assumption that there was a lack of motivation to teach well, which, compensation 
reformers argue, could be increased by providing monetary incentives. It is far more 
likely however, that evaluators lacked the adequate tools to recognize and support 
highly effective teaching. It is thus reasonable to suspect that compensation that aligns 
to this type of teacher evaluations might be more successful. Unfortunately, because 
of the relatively recent development of this generation of evaluation systems, there are 
only a few districts that have implemented new evaluation and compensation systems 
and have been thoroughly evaluated. An exploration of these cases follows. 
Denver
 Denver’s strategic compensation reform originated in the late 1990s, 
when Denver Public Schools and the local teacher unions joined forces to launch 
a comprehensive evaluation and compensation system called ProComp. Under the 
ProComp system, teachers have the opportunity to be rewarded for achievement in 
four areas: knowledge and skills, comprehensive professional evaluation, market 
incentives, and student growth. Authors Goldhaber and Walch sought to determine 
whether the system succeeded in producing improved student achievement scores, 
exploring three alternate pathways for how ProComp could actually cause student 
growth. They explored whether teachers increased focus on their instructional abilities, 
whether feedback and level of support cause professional improvement over time, or 
the possibility that the system altered the recruitment and retention patterns of teachers 
coming into and out of the district. The authors concluded that there was little to no 
impact associated with individual teachers’ performance as a result of the ProComp 
system (Goldhaber & Walch, 2011). 
Chicago
 
 Originally modeled after guidelines proposed by the Milken Family 
Foundation, in 2007 Chicago began offering bonuses to teachers based on their 
performance on a specific observation rubric. Bonuses were distributed at the school 
level, making some schools “Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) schools” and the 
remaining “non-TAP schools.” 
 The authors of the study, Glazerman and Seifullah, found that while teachers 
at TAP schools benefit from increased mentoring from veteran teachers, there was 
ultimately little evidence to suggest that the TAP program was responsible for raising 
student achievement on the Illinois Standards Achievement Test. Ultimately, their data 
indicated that there were heterogeneous results for test score impacts across subjects, 
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years, and schools, yielding no overall relationship between the financial incentive 
program and impact on math, reading, or science test scores (Glazerman & Seifullah, 
2012).
District of Columbia
 In 2009-2010, the District of Columbia Public School system (DCPS) 
launched a new evaluation and compensation system, called IMPACT. Incorporating 
both observation measures as well as student test scores, IMPACT developed 
a reputation for having particularly “high-stakes”or in other words, significant 
consequences, because teachers performing for multiple years at the highest levels 
of the DCPS’s evaluation system were rewarded through both changes to their base 
pay, or yearly compensation, as well as bonuses for outstanding behavior. Conversely, 
teachers who failed to earn proficient ratings for multiple years would be forced to 
leave. 
 The authors utilized a regression-discontinuity (RD) design to examine 
the difference in performance between teachers just above and below the threshold 
for determining a teacher’s evaluation label (such as “Minimally Effective” or 
“Effective”).  This research design was particularly interesting because it allowed for 
a controlled look at how the incentive associated with the performance label affected 
student growth, as there were serious consequences associated with the difference 
of labels. However, teachers performing just above or below a threshold would be 
considered to have relatively comparable quality of teaching. Therefore, distinct 
changes in student growth could be attributed to the effects of the evaluation label, or 
the incentives designed by the “high-stakes” system. 
 They determined through this RD analysis that there were substantial 
effects as a result of IMPACT’s performance management system, resulting in both 
voluntary attrition of low-performing teachers and improving the performance of 
high-performing teachers (Dee & Wyckoff, 2013).
 Again, however, the results are unclear. It seems that merely implementing 
a new evaluation and compensation system, even when the evaluations are tied to 
student performance, is not sufficient to consistently yield student growth. In light of 
this information, policymakers must ask, “Why do some systems work while others 
do not?” This question is at the heart of the design process for districts, including 
Aldine, as they move in the direction of both new evaluation and compensation 
systems. While it may be possible to make some statements about the design and 
implementation of the system itself, to do so would disregard a critical component of 
the initiative’s ultimate success: teachers. There is little, if any information in these 
studies about teacher motivation and behavior, reflecting an incomplete understanding 
of the teaching force and a lapse in the data for analysis . The teaching force is far from 
a monolith, with abundant differentiation between the teachers, schools, and districts 
where the policies were implemented. In other words, there needs to be sufficient 
information such that policy makers can stop asking which reforms “will work” and 
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begin asking which reforms will be implementable under what conditions (Honig, 
2006). It is reasonable to consider that maybe the reason that there is differentiation 
in the results of the pay for performance programs is that there was support for the 
programs in some places and not others.
Existing Literature on Teacher Attitudes Towards Compensation Reform
 While there is some existing research on teacher attitudes towards 
performance-based compensation, it is far from extensive. The majority of research in 
this field, as previously noted, has been devoted to compensation reform’s effectiveness 
in achieving its goals of better student performance. Yet as the previous section of this 
paper has demonstrated, not only is the research split on the issue of effectiveness, but 
ultimately, the results of any one specific initiative mean little without understanding 
the attitudes toward the reform. To better understand this component, some researchers 
have analyzed surveys, with samples ranging from individual schools and school 
districts to the country as a whole. They have determined that a variety of factors 
influence teacher perceptions of compensation reform.
Overview
 In general, teachers seem to be somewhat inclined to support certain types 
of alignments between performance in the classroom and compensation. Additionally, 
once teachers receive some kind of performance pay, they tend to develop stronger 
support for it (Ballou & Podgursky, 1993). 
Teacher Level Factors 
Personality
 For the most part, there is little evidence to suggest that individual personality 
traits or work values matter when teachers consider performance pay (CECR Research 
Synthesis, 2010).
Experience
 Some research supports the idea that teachers with more years in the classroom 
are less supportive of performance pay than their younger counterparts (Ballou & 
Podgursky 1993, Goldhaber, DeArmond, & DeBurgomaster, 2007). Interestingly, a 
comparison study between Generation Y teachers and older teachers revealed that 
while younger teachers tend to favor financial incentives for those who “consistently 
work harder, putting in more time and effort than other teachers,” it was the older 
teachers that wanted increased compensation for teachers with lower performing 
schools, who specialize in harder-to-fill subjects, and whose standardized test scores 
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were higher (Coggshall, Ott, Behrstock, & Lasagna, 2010). These results suggest that 
experience does affect attitudes towards financial incentives, but not necessarily in a 
consistent way. 
System Level Factors
 Unsurprisingly, results indicate that the design and implementation of both 
the evaluation system and compensation system matter when considering teacher 
support for performance-based pay. 
Design
 Multiple studies have examined varying types of performance incentives, 
comparing individualized bonuses to school-wide motivations, as well as the basis 
for the bonuses, such as high student achievement or filling hard-to-staff positions. 
One study determined that teachers are more likely to favor stipends for additional 
responsibilities or possibilities for faster career advancement (Kelley, Odden, 
Milanowski, & Heneman, 2000). Most teachers support incentive pay for extra teacher 
effort and difficult teaching situations, and 42% supported higher pay for teaching 
hard-to-fill subjects (Farkas, Johnson, & Duffett, 2003).  Additionally, teachers support 
financial incentives in the form of bonuses more than they support changes to the base 
pay, or single salary system.
 Yet, according to a study conducted by Jacob and Springer in 2008, teachers 
are almost evenly split on whether pay based on individual performance would 
be favorable to a school-based alternative (Jacob & Springer, 2008). There is also 
evidence that specific design features, such as how easily a system can be influenced 
or manipulated by teachers, affect their perceptions. According to Milanowski (2006), 
this idea suggests that teacher-input in the design process is important.
Trust in the Evaluation System
 Furthermore, teachers’ trust in the evaluation and compensation system is 
essential (Cornett & Gaines 1994,  Milanowski 2006, Murnane & Cohen 1986). In 
2002, Kelly, Heneman, and Milanowski found that the extent to which teachers trusted 
the school system as a whole, as well as the perceived fairness and transparency of the 
pay system, correlated strongly with teachers’ support for performance-based pay. It 
is no surprise, then, that the evaluation system also matters tremendously. On average, 
teachers do not trust evaluations conducted by their school principles because they feel 
that they are too subjective (Baratz-Snowden, 2007).
 Yet this does not mean that teachers are more accepting of the use of 
standardized test scores to measure their performance. A national survey reported 
that while 62% favored financial rewards for teachers who received outstanding 
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principal evaluations, a mere 38% favored rewards for students scoring higher on 
performance measures  (Farkas, Johnson, & Duffett, 2003). This information suggests 
that teachers do not, on average, trust any way of measuring their performance and 
prefer observation data to student test scores. 
School Level Factors
 Additionally, there is ample information regarding the way school culture 
affects teacher attitudes towards performance pay. 
Administration
 Multiple studies report that trust in management, specifically the school 
principal, is essential, as teachers who had faith in their administration also had more 
support for merit pay (Milanowski 2006, Goldhaber, DeArmond, & DeBurgonmaster 
2007).
Professional Community
 There is also extensive research on the effects of a professional community 
on teachers’ acceptance of compensation reform. Teachers with more trust and 
respect for their peers were less supportive of merit pay (Goldhaber, DeArmond, & 
DeBurgonmaster, 2007). Furthermore, teachers widely reported that implementing 
a compensation system that is aligned to performance would have the potential to 
disrupt school culture. In an evaluation of the Texas DATE program, 70% of districts 
reported concerns about the program’s potential to diminish professional relationships 
(Springer, et al., 2010), and in national surveys, somewhere between 56% and 63% 
of teachers noted that they thought pay for performance would engender unhealthy 
competition and jealousy and threaten the collaborative culture of teaching. (Farkas, 
Johnson, & Duffett 2003), Jacob & Springer 2008) 
School Performance
 Research has also found that performance of the school as a whole weakly and 
inversely correlates with attitudes regarding merit pay, as teachers in low-performing 
schools were more supportive than high performing schools (Ballou & Podgursky, 
1993). Conversely, the same authors also concluded that the level of pay a teacher 
receives at his or her school seems to have no effect on his or her attitude (Ballou & 
Podgursky, 1993).
 The impact of school level factors is additionally magnified by Milanowski’s 
2006 study, which presents interesting data on the socialization of teachers, suggesting 
that teachers are heavily influenced by the opinions of their surrounding peers. 
Take-Aways from Existing Literature
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There are a few major points that should be taken from this collection of research. First, 
context matters. There are a wide variety of factors that affect teacher perceptions of 
performance-based pay, and therefore every teaching force can be expected to react 
a little differently depending on the design and implementation of the evaluation and 
compensation system, the make-up of the teaching force as whole and the culture 
existing within their schools. It is important to recognize, therefore, that teacher 
attitudes in different districts, under the influence of different policies and systems 
will have differing feelings on compensation reform.
 Second, teacher attitudes vary according to three sets of factors: teacher level, 
system level, and school level. Mixed results can be found within each of these broad 
categories, making it challenging for policy makers to predict attitudes ahead of time.
 Third, this already complicated picture becomes increasingly complex as the 
contemporary education climate is factored into the situation. As the education climate 
changes rapidly, attitudes of teachers adapt along with it. In addition to the changes 
in evaluation and compensation laws, the “younger” teachers in the majority of the 
surveyed studies are continuing on in the classroom while the stereotypical veteran 
opposition may be phasing out. Finally, support for compensation reform nationally 
(amongst teachers and non-teachers alike) is ascending. A 2010 Gallup poll found that 
72% of public school parents and 71% of adults nationwide believe pay should be 
aligned to teaching quality (Bushaw & Lopez, 2010).
 These findings paint a very different picture of compensation reform than 
existed fifteen years ago, creating a complicated landscape for policy makers who 
wish to experiment with compensation reform in their district. There is indication 
that teacher support matters, but given the wide variety of factors that affect teacher 
attitudes, it is challenging to figure out exactly where compensation reform will 
succeed in achieving its desired goals. Additionally, even when fully executed, it still 
remains unclear whether the system will necessarily yield higher student achievement. 
Regardless, a compensation system can serve as a way to reflect district values 
regarding rewarding teacher performance and serve as recruitment tactic for highly 
motivated graduates considering teaching. As district leadership, such as that in the 
Aldine Independent School District, contemplates the design and implementation of a 
new compensation system that is aligned to performance, it will be important that they 
consider existing teacher attitudes. 
The Case of Aldine ISD 
About Aldine 
 Operation Public Education, a University of Pennsylvania-affiliated 
education-consulting group, partnered with the Aldine Independent School District 
in 2011. Aldine is located just inside the outer edge of Houston more resembles a 
semi-rural, small town than one of the fastest growing cities in America. The district 
consists of only Title I schools and serves over 67,000 students. Demographically, 
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the students are almost exclusively of racial minorities, with 70.8% identifying as 
Hispanic, 25.1% identifying as African American, and only two percent identifying as 
white. The district has a teaching force of 4,200 and oversees 78 campuses, rendering 
it the 10th largest district in the state (Aldine Independent School District, 2014).
 Under the leadership of OPE Director, Dr. Theodore Hershberg and Assistant 
Director, Claire Robertson-Kraft, the team worked with district leadership to design 
and implement a new performance management system, called INVEST.  INVEST 
consists of two large components, a teacher observation portion and a student growth 
portion, each contributing 50% of a teacher’s overall evaluation score. The observation 
system uses Charlotte Danielson’s Framework for Teaching, which divides the practice 
of teaching into four distinct and separate domains: 
 
 Domain 1: Planning and Preparation 
 Domain 2: The Classroom Environment
 Domain 3: Instruction
 Domain 4: Professional Responsibilities
 Assessment in each domain yields an overall label of one of the following: 
ineffective, needs improvement, effective or highly effective. Observations are usually 
conducted by principals or assistant principals, who are instructed to both schedule 
times for planned formal observations as well as conduct surprise “walk-throughs” 
throughout the course of the year. 
 To measure student growth, the district uses student growth percentiles 
(SGPs).  SGPs measure the progression of a child as compared to his peers with 
similar test scores from the previous year.  This way of measuring growth allows 
for results to be normed across the district and for students to serve as their own 
control. To calculate SGPs, AISD uses the results from the Texas state exams. After 
one year of pilot implementation of INVEST, the team shifted focus to the alignment 
of compensation to the new evaluation system. A working group, consisting of 
district teachers, principles, and support staff, was assembled to help design a system 
that would be amenable to the teaching force as whole. The district hopes to finish 
designing the system by the end of the 2013-2014 school year and run a shadow pilot 
the following year, ultimately implementing a new compensation system in fall of 
2015.
Research Purpose, Design, and Methodology 
 As evidenced by the literature review, there is significant evidence to 
suggest that teacher attitudes towards a performance management system affect their 
motivation. Additionally, multiple studies indicate that teacher attitudes towards 
performance-based compensation varies depending on a variety of teacher-, school-, 
and district-level characteristics. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to determine 
the current attitudes of Aldine teachers towards implementing a new compensation 
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system. These observations can then be used to make policy recommendations to 
OPE, Aldine ISD, and the many districts in similar situations to Aldine regarding how 
to best condition the teaching force to be amenable to this type of high-stakes reform. 
The data used in this study was collected by OPE as part of a larger research project 
on the implementation of INVEST. 
 In order to evaluate the attitudes of teachers, I used data collected from two 
sets of surveys administered to teachers in Fall of 2012 and Spring of 2013. I analyzed 
results only from those teachers who completed both surveys and taught in a school 
where INVEST was piloted that year. On the spring survey, teachers were asked to 
respond the question, “Teachers should be financially rewarded for outstanding 
performance” on a five point scale (ranging from “disagree strongly” to “agree 
strongly”). Their responses were coded, with “disagree strongly” corresponding to 1 
and “agree strongly” to 5, allowing the extent of their support to be analyzed in relation 
to their strength of agreement towards other statements regarding their personality, 
environment, and feelings regarding the design and implementation of the evaluation 
system. Additionally, for the purposes of this paper, I will use performance pay and 
merit pay synonymously, and defined as a compensation system that aligns financial 
incentives to teacher performance.
Findings 
Overall
 When examined overall for my sample, 1038 teachers, it seems the teachers 
have a slightly favorable impression of performance-based pay. Their total mean of 3.62 
with a standard deviation of 1.19 suggests that teachers are, on average, somewhere 
between neutral and positive regarding aligning financial rewards to performance in 
the classroom. 
114           SPICE | Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Undergraduate Journal
Teacher Attitudes Towards Performance-Based Compensation Reform
 This histograph indicates that while the majority of teachers are not opposed 
to performance-based pay, about a quarter of teachers oppose or strongly oppose this 
type of compensation system. This type of more general information provides us with 
a broad picture of teacher perceptions of merit pay, it does not give any insight into 
which teachers support or oppose, or why a specific group of teachers might believe 
what they do. In order to develop a more detailed profile of teacher attitudes towards 
performance-based pay, I looked at three different areas that might affect their beliefs: 
characteristics of the individual teachers, their perceptions of the evaluation system, 
and the conditions of their school.
Teacher Level Characteristics
 Teacher level characteristics are defined, for my purposes, as those traits or 
characteristics that affect a teacher in an individualized way. This means that within 
a given school, the teaching staff would vary for this set of factors, such as years of 
experience, grade taught, overall performance outcome score, and personality type. 
Experience
Table 1: Means by Years Experience: First Years – Results from t-test
Years Teaching Mean (SD) N
First years 3.77 (1.240) 82
Teachers not in their first year 3.59 (1.200) 936
Note. *p<.01, **p,.001  
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Table 2: Means by Years Experience: Veterans – Results from t-test
Years Teaching Mean (SD) N
Veterans 3.46 (1.267) 501**
Teachers with 9 years or 
less of experience
3.74 (1.123) 517**
Note. *p<.01, **p,.001  
 I performed a t-test to examine the mean responses of two groups of teachers: 
first years, and veterans (ten years or more experience). I found that the number of 
years experience did matter, as determined by comparing means between teachers who 
met a certain experience level (such as 1 year experience) to the rest of the teaching 
population in Aldine.  The results from this analysis reveal that teachers with 10 years 
or more of experience, or veterans, have significantly less support for performance pay 
than teachers who have been teaching for less time. These results are consistent with 
the body of literature. 
Performance
Table 3: Correlations Between Support for Financial Incentives and Performance 
Measures
Performance Measure N Pearson Correlation
SGP 2013 334 0.045
SGP 2012 242 0.041
SGP 2011 188 -0.138
Danielson – Overall Domain 1 1036 0.038
Danielson – Overall Domain 2 1038 0.083**
Danielson – Overall Domain 3 1038 0.041
Danielson – Overall Domain 4 1036 0.059
Danielson 2013 1038 0.060
Note. *p<.01, **p,.001  
 The data indicates that there is essentially no relationship between 
performance on the evaluation system and desire to be paid in accordance with it. This 
finding would be rather surprising if we assumed that teachers based their perception 
of performance pay on their potential payoff. Conceptualizing teachers in this way 
would lead one to intuitively assume that the teachers who performed well on the 
system would want to be compensated accordingly. Conversely, one would think that 
teachers who had more to lose by adopting a system that aligns to their evaluation 
scores would be stronger opponents. However, this pattern has no support from the 
116           SPICE | Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Undergraduate Journal
Teacher Attitudes Towards Performance-Based Compensation Reform
data, implying that teachers’ attitudes are not informed by personal incentives.
Labels Matter
Table 4: Means by Label on Danielson Rubric  
2013 Danielson Label Mean (SD) N
Ineffective 3.88 (0.781) 17
Needs Improvement 3.28 (1.221) 99
Effective 3.64 (1.187) 805
Highly Effective 3.74 (1.217) 116
 Table 4 presents the means for teacher support of performance pay 
disaggregated by Danielson “label,” or the category assigned to a teacher based on his 
or her score on the Danielson rubric. Each category has discrete thresholds for scores, 
meaning that two teachers that do not differ much in numerical score may fall into 
two different categories. Table 3 demonstrated that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between how an individual scores on Danielson and their perception of 
merit pay. However, there is a relationship in accordance with the Danielson label.
 The high mean for Ineffective teachers can be disregarded due to the small 
sample size. However, there is a large and statistically significant (p = 0.006) difference 
between the teachers in the Needs Improvement and Highly Effective categories. 
 This finding implies that categorization affects teachers’ perception of the 
evaluation system. Tables 3 and 4 indicate that there is not a relationship between the 
continuous score on Danielson and their perceptions (Table 3) but only the categorical 
score on Danielson and their perceptions, which suggests that the rating matters. To 
clarify, this does not mean that better teachers always have more favorable perceptions, 
but rather that the teachers that are categorized as better have better attitudes. The 
conclusion that one can draw from this finding is that the people around the margins 
of the divisions between Danielson labels will behave very differently based on how 
they’re assigned. 
 This finding is very interesting when contextualized in the results from 
Thomas Dee and James Wyckoff’s 2013 study on Washington DC’s evaluation and 
compensation system, IMPACT. As previously mentioned, Dee and Wyckoff used a 
regression-discontinuity design for their analysis, examining teachers who were just 
above and below the threshold for a performance label in the evaluation system. The 
authors concluded that the incentives associated with the label had to be the basis for 
the differences in teacher retention and student performance between the teachers who 
were just above or below a threshold. 
 The findings from this analysis, however, might suggest that it is the label 
itself that causes some of the effects, not necessarily the consequences attached. Aldine 
teachers, under the INVEST system, have none of the high-stakes consequences 
attached to evaluation under DC’s IMPACT system. This means that merely being 
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labeled under the performance management system is capable of affecting attitudes 
and perceptions of aspects of the system, something not necessarily accounted for in 
Dee and Wyckoff’s research. Another key difference between this analysis and Dee 
and Wyckoff’s work is that the DC study examined behaviors associated with the 
labels, such as teacher retention and changes in student growth scores. 
Personality
Table 5: Correlations Between Personality Traits and Support for Performance Pay
Personality Trait Pearson Correlation
Grit 0.231**
Note. *p<.01, **p,.001 
Table 6: Questions Comprising Personality Scales
Scale Survey Questions
Grit Right now, my interest in teaching is about the same as it was before the 
school year began 
I am working as hard as I did at the beginning of the school year
Lately, setbacks have not discouraged me 
Every day, I actively try to improve my teaching
Nothing is more important to me than improving my teaching
 I found no literature regarding how personality type might influence attitudes 
towards performance-based pay. My data shows that while most tested personality 
traits seem to barely correlate, if at all, grit is unique in that it correlates moderately 
with the belief that teachers should be compensated according to their classroom 
performance. Grit is a term originally coined by Angela Duckworth and is defined 
as is “the tendency to sustain interest in and effort toward very long-term goals” 
(Duckworth, Matthews, Kelly, & Peterson, 2007). Grouped with traits such as self-
control and resilience, grit is very much associated with being able to commit to and 
achieve long-term goals, even when obstacles may get in the way. 
 The moderate correlation between grit and positive perception of performance 
incentives makes some intuitive sense. Teachers who are resilient and capable of 
sticking with a goal even when it becomes challenging might see what occurs in their 
classroom more within their control, and therefore feel better about being evaluated 
and, therefore, compensated according to what occurs there. Gritty teachers do not 
become discouraged by initial set backs, maintaining a belief that their long-term goal 
is achievable. This attitude can be easily applied to INVEST, where gritty teachers 
would believe that it was possible to score highly on the evaluation system, and 
therefore be compensated fairly and well.  
Perception Of the Evaluation System 
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Table 7: Correlations Between Support for Financial Incentives and Perception of the 
Evaluation System
Perception of the System Pearson Correlation
Evaluation Accurate and Fair Scale 0.274**
INVEST Fairness Measures Scale 0.344**
Evaluation Feedback and Growth Scale 0.298**
Danielson Framework Overall is Accurate and Fair 0.276**
SGP is an accurate and fair measure for teaching performance 0.298**
INVEST Understanding Scale 0.274**
INVEST has positive impact in Aldine ISD 0.344**
Evaluation Accurate and Fair Scale 0.298**
Note. *p<.01, **p,.001  




My evaluator’s observations of my classroom this year 
accurately captured by performance as a teacher
Overall, the teacher evaluation system used this year was fair
I agree with my evaluator’s assessment of my performance
My evaluator’s observations of my classroom this year 
accurately captured by performance as a teacher
Overall, the teacher evaluation system used this year was fair
INVEST Fairness 
Measures Scale
Domain 1 (Planning and Preparation) is accurate and fair.
Domain 2 (Classroom Environment) is accurate and fair
Domain 3 (Classroom Instruction) is accurate and fair
Domain 4 (Professional Responsibilities) is accurate and fair





INVEST provides specific feedback on areas to improve my 
teaching
INVEST provides the support I need to improve my teaching
The professional development I received this year was aligned 
to INVEST
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INVEST will lead to improvements in student achievement
INVEST will help me improve my teaching
INVEST will support teacher development
 
 It is obvious that perception of the evaluation system is an important factor 
in influencing a teacher’s attitude towards performance-based pay. All of the tested 
measures regarding teacher’s perceptions of INVEST were correlated with their 
belief in merit pay. This result is hardly surprising, as teachers undoubtedly want 
financial incentives that they feel reflect attainable goals. In other words, if people 
feel their evaluation does not reflect an objective or complete picture of their work 
in the classroom, it is unlikely that they would want any sort of high stakes decision 
to be associated with it.  Of particular note is the strength of the relationship between 
the INVEST Fairness Measure scale and the perception of performance pay, with 
a correlation of 0.344 that is significant at the p<.01 level. Yet when one looks at 
the components of INVEST including the observation evaluation inputs, the student 
growth inputs, and the feedback outputs, it’s clear that no one element correlates as 
strongly as belief in the fairness of the system as a whole.
 Similarly, there is a moderate relationship between a belief that INVEST has a 
positive impact in Aldine and desire to be compensated according to the performance. 
Because of the lack of detail regarding the compensation-related question, it is 
impossible to know the exact motivations behind any given response. However, I 
would speculate that the type of teacher who would appreciate the rationale behind the 
design of INVEST, and therefore think it would benefit AISD as a whole, would also 
appreciate the way performance-based compensation reform would value high quality 
teaching. 
School Level Characteristics
 School level characteristics are those factors that deal with the environment 
of the school as a whole and would not be expected to vary considerably for individual 
teachers within any one school. For the purposes of this paper, these school level 
characteristics mostly exist of teachers’ perceptions of school leadership and the 
general environment of the school.
Table 9: Correlations Between Support for Financial Incentives and Perception of 
School Culture
Perception of the System Pearson Correlation
Quality of administration scale 0.22**
Level of support scale 0.24**
Level of control scale 0.23**
Professional community scale 0.19**
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Leadership scale 0.22**
Quality of administration scale 0.22**
Level of support scale 0.24**
Note. *p<.01, **p,.001  
 
Table 10: Questions Comprising School Culture Scales
Scale Survey Questions
Quality of Administration The school administration’s behavior toward the staff is 
supportive and encouraging
My principal enforces school rules for student conduct 
and backs me up when I need it
The principal knows what kind of school he or she 
wants and has communicated that to the staff
Level of Support I am given the support I need to teach students with 
special needs
Necessary materials such as textbooks, supplies, and 
copy machines are available as needed by the staff
I receive a great deal of support from parents for the 
work that I do
Level of control scale I have control over selecting content, topics, and skills 
to be taught in my classroom
I have control over selecting teaching techniques I use 
in the classroom
I have control over disciplining students
Professional community 
scale
Rules for student behavior are consistently enforced by 
teachers in this school, even for students who are not in 
their classes
Most of my colleagues share my beliefs and values 
about what the central mission of the school should be
There is a great deal of cooperative effort among the 
staff members
Leadership scale My principal makes clear to his or her staff expectations 
for meeting instructional goals
My principal communicates a clear vision for our school
My principal presses teachers to implement what they 
have learned in professional development
My principal knows what’s going on in my classroom
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It’s OK to discuss feelings, worries, and frustrations 
with my principals
I trust my principal at his or her word
The principal at this school is an effective manager who 
makes the school run smoothly
I really respect my principal as an educator
 
The data suggests that there is a moderate relationship between most school level 
factors and perception of performance pay. Both teachers’ perceptions of the quality 
of their administration and leadership have strong correlations of 0.22, significant at 
the p<.01 level. This finding makes a lot of sense in the context of the new evaluation 
system. If teachers are confident in the capabilities and leadership of their school 
administration, it is likely they believe INVEST was implemented in a reasonably 
effective and fair way. In other words, teachers probably trust their administration to 
make high-stakes decisions, such as determining their compensation. 
 Closely related to this interpretation of the importance of administration is 
the relationship between level of support and perception of merit pay. It is reasonable 
to think that if teachers feel they have an adversarial relationship with their bosses 
or co-workers, they might not want the administration to have any control over their 
compensation through the evaluation process. Also, level of support could reflect how 
confident a teacher is in her administration’s ability to provide the type of feedback 
that will help her to improve and thrive. 
 Additionally, it is important to note the positive relationship between 
perception of a strong professional community and attitude toward performance pay. 
This finding is interesting because it is contrary to considerable literature regarding 
teacher sentiments on merit pay (Jacob and Springer 2008, Goldhaber 2007). Most 
researchers have found that teachers who have trusting and collaborative relationships 
with their co-workers tend to feel less support for compensation systems that align pay 
with performance. This has traditionally been attributed to a sense of competition that 
develops between teachers when they are eligible for the same financial incentives. 
However, this finding demonstrates why it is important to conduct this sort of 
research on the new generation of teacher evaluations and compensation systems. A 
compensation system that redesigns the single salary schedule to align to performance 
metrics, rather than offering zero-sum bonuses on top of it, mitigates this issue entirely. 
There would be no personal cost to being supportive and collaborative in this new type 
of compensation and evaluation system. The positive relationship demonstrated by the 
findings suggests that teachers understand this.
 Finally, school characteristics vary across different types of schools, as does 
teachers’ perceptions of performance pay. While some schools have a mean support 
level of 4.04, others have means that are below 3.0. It is unlikely that these differences 
are due to chance. It is easy to see they way school culture and working conditions 
affect teacher attitudes. 
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Discussion
 The findings from my analysis of teacher surveys from the Aldine school 
district both confirm and weaken existing literature regarding teacher attitudes 
towards performance-based compensation. Results from the AISD teaching force 
regarding their general acceptance of performance-based compensation supported 
existing literature. Additionally, like every major study previously published on 
teacher attitudes, I also found that teachers more years experience had a stronger 
opposition to merit pay than their less experienced peers. Furthermore, my findings 
strengthen existing literature regarding the positive relationship between having trust 
in both the design of the system itself, as well as the administration, and perception 
of performance pay. However, Aldine teachers contributed new information to the 
field regarding the effects of personality on teacher attitudes. While previous literature 
suggested that personality did not affect attitudes, I found that one personality trait 
had a strong correlation with perception of performance pay: grit. Probably due to 
its relatively recent coinage, grit and resilience were two traits not tested in previous 
studies.
 These supports and deviations from the previous literature provide interesting 
insight into teacher attitudes towards the contemporary age of education reform. No 
study has yet been conducted on teacher attitudes towards compensation reform in a 
district that is using this modern of an evaluation system. Additionally, while most 
literature examined a specific proposed compensation initiative, this survey treats 
the compensation system as a very abstract concept. The Aldine Independent School 
District, and its evaluation system, INVEST, provide the perfect opportunity to explore 
how teachers feel not only about performance-based compensation in a theoretical 
sense, but how they feel about merit pay at this particular time of intense transition in 
the district and country. 
 It is in this context that a few larger themes emerge regarding how teachers 
perceive performance-based pay. 
Teacher Level Factor: Control
 A teacher’s sense of control refers to her belief that her actions can and will 
yield a predictable and desired outcome. It is intuitive to think that teachers would want 
to be evaluated and compensated on elements of their profession that are within their 
control, where their choices, work ethic, and talent are recognized and rewarded, while 
they are not punished for things that are outside their sphere of influence. Therefore it 
is unsurprising that teachers who feel that they have more control both as an individual 
in their classroom and in the school have higher support for performance-based pay. 
 This explanation is supported by the finding that grit has a strong positive 
correlation with acceptance of merit pay. Gritty teachers are those who are capable 
  Volume 10 | Spring 2015           123
Natalie Gould
of staying committed to long-term goals, such as performance goals, even when 
encountering resistance. These professionals see challenges as merely temporary 
obstacles, because they know that they can control, to a reasonable extent, what their 
future will hold. 
System-Level Factor: Fairness
 Teacher perceptions of the INVEST system had the strongest relationship 
with their support of compensation reform. Teachers who thought that INVEST was 
designed fairly and predicted it would have a positive impact on the district were 
very supportive of using the evaluation system to determine their pay. Conversely, 
teachers who were skeptical of the evaluation system, were also skeptical of applying 
it to compensation decisions. It is intuitive that teachers want to feel that high stakes 
decisions are being made fairly, and do not want to be held accountable for things that 
they perceive as being outside their purview. 
 Additionally, a key finding from this study was that interaction with the 
evaluation system actually affected teacher attitudes towards compensation, as an 
assigned label on the Danielson rubric had a much stronger relationship with perception 
of performance pay than the outcome scores. This means that Aldine will have to be 
cautious regarding how information about these labels is presented to the teaching 
force, as teachers are serious about the category ascribed to them. 
 These findings also demonstrate the importance of teacher voice in the design 
and implementation process for new policies. Teachers who have had a meaningful 
role in creating the policy will be more likely to embrace it when it is implemented. 
School-Level Factor: Trust
 School culture seems to also being playing a large role in determining 
teachers’ attitudes towards performance pay. This is particularly true regarding teacher 
trust in both their peers and their administration. 
 The data indicates that there is a weak positive correlation between the 
strength of a school’s professional community and its teachers’ perceptions of merit 
pay. This finding contradicts all of the existing research regarding perceptions of 
professional communities, which suggest that teachers dislike financial incentives 
because it weakens a collaborative environment in a school community. Aldine 
teachers also indicated a strong relationship between trust in their administration and 
their attitude toward performance pay. Both of these elements can contribute to the 
feeling of support at a school, including aspects such as the availability of materials 
and instructional help. When tested for specifically, level of support had the strongest 
positive correlation of any school-level factor. 
 This explanation of school culture supports Milanowski’s theory of 
socialization, or that the opinions of the teachers whom work with matter significantly 
when determining views on things that require employer discretion, such as merit 
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pay (2006).  This argument for socialization provides greater nuance to the data 
regarding professional community, as the teaching force at a school affects any 
individual teacher’s perception through not only their level of support (in the form of a 
professional community). By sharing opinions on performance pay, teachers are likely 
to influence each other. 
 
Limitations and Areas for Further Exploration
 It is important to note that there are some significant sources of error in this 
analysis. First, unlike much of the literature previously discussed in this paper, the 
survey I used for my analysis was not designed with the intent of determining teacher 
attitudes towards performance pay. Rather, there was only one question that directly 
mentioned compensation in the administered surveys, and therefore is incapable of 
providing as detailed results as would be possible with a survey designed for this 
express purpose. 
 Second, the one question was only administered one time. The question that 
we are interested in was only asked on the second survey, meaning that there is no 
information about the way attitudes regarding performance pay changed over the course 
of the year as the evaluation system was being piloted. Third, it is also important to 
note that the question at hand was administered during the spring survey, after INVEST 
had been piloted for a full year. As to be expected with the implementation of any 
new evaluation system, teacher perceptions of their administration and school culture 
deteriorated somewhat from the beginning to the end of the year. This can be explained 
by teachers’ frustration with the design of the system, the way it was communicated to 
them, their ultimate performance, or just a general resistance to change. However, it is 
reasonable to assume that all of these factors could influence a slightly more negative 
perception of performance-based pay than would have presented at the beginning of 
the year had teachers been asked to respond at that time. 
 There are many aspects of teacher attitudes towards performance-based pay 
that were not adequately explored in a study of this scope. Opportunities for future 
research include expanding the conception to performance pay to examine different 
types of performance-based compensation initiatives in greater detail. Unlike previous 
literature, my study cannot provide any insight into which types of compensation 
reform (such as stipends for hard to staff positions versus changes to base pay due 
to INVEST ratings) teachers support or oppose. This information could be incredibly 
useful to a district as they approach the design of a new compensation system. 
 Additionally, to delve deeper into my findings, qualitative and quantitative 
data regarding school culture, control, and perception of teacher evaluation at the 
schools with the highest and lowest support for performance-based compensation 
reform would provide deeper insight as to what individual schools are doing to create 
highly supportive (or deeply resistant) environments for performance pay. 
Lastly, this analysis suggests that the labels assigned to teachers in accordance with 
the teacher evaluation system could affect their attitudes. It would be interesting to 
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explore how teacher’s behaviors were affected by labels, particularly since Aldine, for 
the time being, has no high-stakes consequences attached to its evaluations.
Conclusion
 For the past thirty years, policy makers have experimented with the idea 
of performance-based pay as way to improve student test scores. Existing literature 
suggests that the impact of these programs is mixed, and prompts a further look into 
teacher support of this type of initiative. The Aldine Independent School District 
presents a unique opportunity to examine teacher attitudes towards performance-based 
compensation reform because the district has within the last two years implemented 
a new, modern, teacher evaluation system that uses a highly validated rubric and 
student growth percentiles to measure performance. No studies regarding teacher 
attitudes towards merit pay have had this type of evaluation system, designed to be 
exceptionally objective and provide extensive support and feedback to its teachers. 
 The results from Aldine teacher survey suggest that three themes drive teacher 
support or opposition to performance-based compensation: control, fairness, and trust. 
Control matters as teachers need to feel empowered be gritty and autonomous in 
their classroom. Fairness of the evaluation system is essential to teachers embracing 
compensation reform, as they do not want their salary to be influenced by exogenous 
factors. Culture, defined as the level of support between a teacher and his peers and 
administrator, manifests as teachers determine whether to trust the design of the 
evaluation, and incorporates many principal competencies, such as communication, 
management style, and usefulness of feedback.  
 This conclusion has policy implications for both Aldine and school districts 
across the country. As new evaluation systems and compensation reform gain 
increasing momentum, districts need to consider how to most effectively implement 
policies. AISD hopes to implement a new compensation system aligned to INVEST 
for the 2015-2016 school year, which means the district is currently poised to make 
decisions about how to best execute the implementation process.   As research indicates 
that policies that have teacher support are implemented more smoothly, efficiently, 
and effectively, districts looking to develop new compensation systems have a vested 
interest in generating positive attitudes towards performance-based pay. 
 The results from this study indicate that teacher’s sense of control, perception 
of the evaluation system, and trust in their school culture are incredibly important when 
determining their support for merit pay. Unlike previous research that has suggested 
that teacher beliefs are somewhat static (determined by things like years experience or 
age of students), these three areas that can be somewhat manipulated through effective 
policies, and allow districts to actually improve teacher attitudes before, during, and 
after the design and implementation process. 
 Control, fairness and trust can be bolstered by effective school and district 
leadership. For teachers to develop a sense of both control and support, a principal 
must strike a somewhat challenging, but definitely feasible, balance between giving 
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teachers autonomy and voice, while also providing the necessary supports through 
effective communication and vision for the school. Fairness can be achieved through 
an open system design process, where teachers have an opportunity to meaningfully 
voice their concerns about the components of an evaluation system. 
 Additionally, Milanowski’s theory of socialization creates an enormous 
implication for school and district leadership. The theory suggests that teachers learn 
what to believe, or develop their opinions regarding policies like performance-based 
pay primarily by following the example of their peers. This means that within every 
school, district, and even state, there is the potential for a “tipping point” of sorts, 
where the support of a certain number of teachers will exceed the threshold to drive 
support for the school as a whole. By creating environments where some teachers feel 
they have control, support, and believe in the value of their evaluation system, there is 
the chance for the entire community to be positively influenced.
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